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DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LAW
The Court of Appeals deals with the issue of monetary costs and
sanctions for frivolous litigation practices
Frivolous lawsuits employed as instruments of harassment and
delay present expanding problems for already overburdened
courts.' Striving to maintain the efficaciousness of the judicial sys-
tem in an increasingly litigious society,2 courts have sought to re-
duce frivolous litigation by shifting attorneys' fees and costs, a
more stringent penalty than customary sanctions and contempt
proceedings.3 Federal courts have accomplished fee-shifting by ex-
I See Asberry v. United States Postal Serv., 692 F.2d 1378, 1382 (D.C. Cir. 1982). Filing
clearly frivolous suits constitutes an unnecessary and unjustifiable burden on already over-
crowded courts, diminishes the opportunity for careful consideration, and delays access to
the courts by persons with truly deserving causes. Id.
"Lawsuits are expensive and time consuming to courts and litigants alike." Limerick v.
Greenwald, 749 F.2d 97, 101 (1st Cir. 1984). When an attorney fails to look at his case
objectively and appeals because the rules allow it, he commits a wrong against the parties
and the courts. Id.
Between 1940 and 1981, the number of civil cases in federal courts increased approxi-
mately six times as fast as the population of the United States. See Burger, Isn't There a
Better Way?, 68 A.B.A. J. 274, 275 (1982). In state courts for the period 1967-1976, appellate
filings increased at double the rate of population growth. Id.
2 See Golden Eagle Distrib. Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 801 F.2d 1531, 1540 (9th Cir.
1986); see also Zaldivar v. City of Los Angeles, 780 F.2d 823, 829 (9th Cir. 1986) (to remedy
attorney misconduct look to Fed. R. Civ. P. 11); Gabrelian v. Gabrelian, 108 App. Div. 2d
445, 452, 489 N.Y.S.2d 914, 921 (2d Dep't 1985) (attorneys and parties who engage in "dila-
tory or frivolous conduct during litigation . . . impede . . . orderly administration of jus-
tice" and impose undue burdens on system) (quoting Karutz v. Chicago Title Ins. Co., 112
Misc. 2d 815, 820, 451 N.Y.S.2d 1001, 1004-05 (Sup. Ct. App. T. 2d Dep't 1981)), appeal
dismissed, 66 N.Y.2d 741, 488 N.E.2d 211, 497 N.Y.S.2d 365 (1985).
A major problem facing today's courts is to preserve the judicial system's effectiveness
in the wake of increasing litigation. While reallocation of attorneys' fees is one way to dis-
courage wasting judicial resources, the author cautions that courts must maintain the proper
balance between discouraging abuse and allowing free access to the courts. See Mallor, Pu-
nitive Attorneys' Fees for Abuses of the Judicial System, 61 N.C.L. REv. 613, 615 (1983);
see generally Comment, Court Awarded Attorney's Fees and Equal Access to the Courts,
122 U. PA. L. REv. 636, 653 (1974) (current practice breeds abuse, fails to discourage un-
founded and vexatious claims).
I See, e.g., Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 764-65 (1980) (although most
prominent inherent power of federal courts is contempt sanction, in "narrowly defined cir-
cumstances" courts may force counsel to pay attorneys' fees). The United States Supreme
Court has held that federal courts have the power to assess attorneys' fees against parties
who litigate in bad faith and against counsel who wilfully abuse judicial processes. See id. at
766; Mallor, supra note 2, at 615; Comment, supra note 2, at 652-53.
Existing remedies for abusive conduct include disciplinary proceedings, see N.Y. JUD.
LAW § 90 (McKinney 1983 & Supp. 1988), contempt proceedings, see N.Y. PENAL LAW §§
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ercising inherent judicial powers,4 by statutory exception,5 and by
invoking Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.6 In au-
210.05-.15 (McKinney 1986), and malicious prosecution suits. See Note, Groundless Litiga-
tion and the Malicious Prosecution Debate: A Historical Analysis, 88 YALE L.J. 1218, 1218
(1979) [hereinafter Note, Groundless Litigation].
"The use of a motion for contempt as a negotiating tool, or to threaten and intimidate
... constitutes an abuse of the process of this court . . . ." Photosound, Inc. v. Gourdine,
126 Misc. 2d 495, 498, 482 N.Y.S.2d 993, 996 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1984), modified, 118
App. Div. 2d 472, 479 N.Y.S.2d 751 (1st Dep't 1986). The Photosound court concluded that
"more drastic measures should be taken to discourage this type of frivolous motion prac-
tice," id. at 495, 482 N.Y.S.2d at 994, and recognized that the best method to make the
respondent whole was to award attorneys' fees. Id. at 499, 482 N.Y.S.2d at 996.
Perjury proceedings often present evidentiary problems, see N.Y. PENAL LAW § 210.50
(McKinney 1975), as proof of perjury may not be established by the uncorroborated testi-
mony of sole witness. See id. Guilt must be established beyond a reasonable doubt in such
proceedings. See id., commentary at 497.
Malicious prosecution also has been criticized as a useless remedy. See Note, Ground-
less Litigation, supra, at 1218. Noting that only America "places a subsequent tort action at
the core of its machinery for dealing with groundless litigation," id. at 1221, the author
suggests that a preferred solution would promote primary reliance on controls available
within the groundless suits themselves. See id.
4 See, e.g., Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 259 (1975)
(unless forbidden by Congress, courts have inherent powers to allow attorney fees); Hall v.
Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1973) (federal courts, exercising "equitable powers" may award attor-
ney fees if justice will be served); see also 6 J. MOORE, W. TAGGART & J. WICKER, MOORE'S
FEDERAL PRACTICE 54.78[3] (2d ed. 1987) (discussing equitable powers of courts to award
fees); Comment, Sanctions Imposed by Courts on Attorneys Who Abuse the Judicial Pro-
cess, 44 U. CH. L. REV. 619, 633 (1977) (courts have inherent power to establish rules gov-
erning proceedings).
Under the inherent powers doctrine, federal courts have allowed exceptions to the gen-
eral American rule which denies recovery of legal fees to successful litigants. See, e.g., Road-
way Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 765 (1980) ("in narrowly defined circumstances
federal courts have inherent power to assess attorney's fees"); Sprague v. Ticonic Nat'l
Bank, 307 U.S. 161, 164 (1939) ("[a]llowance of such costs in appropriate situations is part
of the historic equity jurisdiction of the federal courts"). One of the most common excep-
tions under the American rule has been the bad faith exception, in which fees are awarded
for wanton, oppressive or vexatious violations. See Roadway Express, 447 U.S. at 766. See
generally Mallor, supra note 2, at 630-32 (bad faith exceptions).
5 See, e.g., Civil Rights Attorneys' Fees Award Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-559, § 2, 90
Stat. 2641 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982)) (provisions awarding attorneys'
fees in actions under Civil Rights Act); Lanham Act, Pub. L. No. 93-600, § 3, 88 Stat. 1955
(1946) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1117 (1982)) (in trademark violation actions
courts, in exceptional cases, may award reasonable attorneys' fees); Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 4,
38 Stat. 731 (1914) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (1982)) (successful plaintiff in
antitrust litigation may recover cost of suit and attorneys' fees). See also Note, Awards of
Attorney's Fees in the Federal Courts, 56 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 277, 320-23 (1982) (most statu-
tory fee-shifting provisions employ permissive terms).
( See FED. R. Civ. P. 11. Rule 11 provides in pertinent part:
Every pleading, motion, and other paper of a party represented by an attorney
shall be signed by at least one attorney of record in his individual name, whose
address shall be stated .... The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a
19871 .173
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thorizing monetary sanctions against attorneys and individual par-
ties for frivolous litigation practices, New York State courts have
relied on the inherent judicial power of the courts7 and the very
narrow statutory authority under amended CPLR 8303-a.s How-
certificate by him that he has read the pleading, motion, or other paper; that to
the best of his knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry
it is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good faith argu-
ment for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, and that it is not
interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary
delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation.
Id. Rule 11, as amended in 1983, was intended to reduce the reluctance of courts to impose
sanctions when abuses in trial practice are apparent. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11, advisory com-
mittee's note on 1983 Amendment, reprinted in 2A J. MOORE, W. TAGGART & J. WICKER,
supra note 4, 11.04[4].
Federal courts have applied Rule 11 in an effort to deter dilatory claims and motions.
See Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, 762 F.2d 243, 254 (2d Cir. 1985); Rodgers v.
Lincoln Towing Serv. Inc., 596 F. Supp. 13, 22 (N.D. Ill. 1984), aff'd, 771 F.2d 194 (7th Cir.
1985); Tedeschi v. Smith Barney, Harris Upham & Co., 579 F. Supp. 657, 660 (S.D.N.Y.
1984), aff'd, 757 F.2d 465 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 850 (1985). For a discussion of the
problems involved in the application and interpretation of Rule 11, see Cavanagh, Develop-
ing Standards Under Amended Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 14 HOF-
STRA L. REv. 499, passim (1986); infra notes 38-40 and accompanying text.
I See, e.g., Gabrelian v. Gabrelian, 108 App. Div. 2d 445, 445, 489 N.Y.S.2d 914, 916 (2d
Dep't), appeal dismissed, 66 N.Y.2d 741, 488 N.E.2d 111, 497 N.Y.S.2d 365 (1985). In
Gabrelian, which involved an underlying matrimonial action, the husband brought con-
tempt charges against his ex-wife contending that she failed to abide by a judgment order-
ing division of personal property after the sale of the marital residence. Id. at 446, 489
N.Y.S.2d at 916. The lower court, ruling that there had been no showing of contumacious
conduct by the wife and that the husband had raised issues already decided or dismissed,
imposed a fine on the husband for harassing his ex-wife. Id. While disallowing the fine be-
cause of the circumstances in the case, the Appellate Division, Second Department, recog-
nized the inherent power of the courts to impose a financial assessment on a litigant or his
attorney for repeated filings of frivolous motions. See id. at 448, 489 N.Y.S.2d at 918. "It is
our view that courts of record.., are vested with inherent powers, which are neither derived
from nor dependent upon express statutory authority . . . " Id. See also Karutz v. Chicago
Title Ins. Co., 112 Misc. 2d 815, 451 N.Y.S.2d 1001 (Sup. Ct. App. T. 2d Dep't 1981) (assess-
ment of counsel fees within inherent power of court).
In New York, courts using their inherent powers have imposed monetary sanctions
against attorneys and parties for delaying tactics which frustrate the objectives and proce-
dures of the independent assignment system, see McLoughlin v. Henke, 130 Misc. 2d 1091,
1092, 499 N.Y.S.2d 332, 333 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1986), in foreclosure and sale actions,
see Beacon Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Marks, 97 App. Div. 2d 451, 451, 467 N.Y.S.2d 662,
663 (2d Dep't), appeal dismissed, 60 N.Y.2d 560, 459 N.E.2d 863 (1983), for lawyer procras-
tination in serving and filing notes of issue, see Moran v. Rynar, 39 App. Div. 2d 718, 719,
332 N.Y.S.2d 138, 141 (2d Dep't 1972), and for failure to serve interrogatories during discov-
ery. See Kahn v. Stamp, 52 App. Div. 2d 748, 749, 382 N.Y.S.2d 199, 201 (4th Dep't 1976).
8 CPLR 8303-a (McKinney Supp. 1987). CPLR 8303-a authorizes costs and attorney
fees up to $10,000 against any party advancing a frivolous claim or defense. Id. Originally
limited to medical malpractice actions, it was amended in 1986 to extend to personal injury,
property damage and wrongful death suits. Id. Thus, CPLR 8303-a operates only in tort
claims, and is not applicable to contract, matrimonial, corporate, property, commercial or
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ever, in A.G. Ship Maintenance Corp. v. Lezak,9 the Court of Ap-
peals held that absent a statute or court rule, courts cannot impose
sanctions for frivolous litigation conduct.10
In Lezak, the respondent was an attorney employed by the
Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor.11 The Commission,
which accused the petitioner, a stevedoring corporation, of billing
customers for services never performed, instituted proceedings
against the corporation.1 2 The petitioner later. charged that during
the course of these proceedings, the respondent falsely represented
his lack of any exculpatory Brady material and that he wrong-
fully withheld such material from the petitioner. 4 Additionally,
petitioner demanded that the respondent be barred from any fur-
ther involvement with proceedings concerning the petitioner or its
affiliates. 5 Although the Commission denied this request, it offered
to reopen the hearings on the Brady issue." The corporation re-
jected this offer and subsequently filed disciplinary charges against
the respondent, which were later dismissed.17
Several years later, the respondent, again acting as attorney
for the Commission, investigated companies closely related to the
petitioner.18 As a result of these investigations, the corporation in-
stituted contempt proceedings and Article 78 proceedings against
the respondent.19 In response, the respondent sought sanctions
against the petitioner for counsel fees and disbursements, claiming
the petitioner acted in bad faith by attempting to harass and in-
any other actions. See id.
69 N.Y.2d 1, 503 N.E.2d 681, 511 N.Y.S.2d 216 (1986).
10 Id. at 6, 503 N.E.2d at 684, 511 N.Y.S.2d at 219.
" Id. at 3, 503 N.E.2d at 684, 511 N.Y.S.2d at 216. The Waterfront Commission polices
activities on the New York/New Jersey harbor fronts in an attempt to eliminate racketeer-
ing, corruption and criminal activities. Id.
12 Id. at 3, 503 N.E.2d at 682, 511 N.Y.S.2d at 217. Eventually, the corporation admit-
ted certain charges and paid a fine. Id.
" Id. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). The exculpatory material derives its
name from a case in which the Supreme Court ruled that suppression of evidence favorable
to the defendant, when requested by the defendant, violates due process when the evidence
is material to either guilt or punishment. Id. at 87-88.
1" Lezak, 69 N.Y.2d at 3, 503 N.E.2d at 682, 511 N.Y.S.2d at 217.
15 See id.
Is Id.
17 Id.
11 Id. The Commission investigated a joint venture partner of the corporation and a
related company in an effort to determine whether there had been federal tax violations. Id.
19 Id. at 3-4, 503 N.E.2d at 682, 511 N.Y.S.2d at 217.
1987]
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timidate him.20 The Supreme Court, Special Term, Kings County,
denied respondent's requested relief,21 and the decision was af-
firmed by the Appellate Division, Second Department.22
The Court of Appeals, in a per curiam opinion, affirmed the
dismissal of the sanctions claim.23 The court recognized "that friv-
olous court proceedings present a growing problem which must be
deterred" and that "[s]uch practices not only injure and debilitate
the honest litigant, but they also waste judicial resources."24 Not-
ing that other deterrents such as disciplinary proceedings for attor-
neys, contempt proceedings, or actions to recover damages based
on theories of malicious prosecution or abuse of process had
proved ineffective, the court concluded that fee-shifting is fre-
quently used to deter abusive practices. 25 The court held, however,
that sanctions against attorneys and parties are best authorized by
plenary rule rather than by ad hoc judicial determination.26 Avoid-
ing the question of whether a court has the inherent authority to
impose sanctions, the Court of Appeals reasoned that such a sys-
tem of sanctions would be best effectuated by the legislature's
power to prescribe rules of practice governing court proceedings.2 7
Under the exercise of rule-making powers delegated by the legisla-
ture, and in the absence of legislation to the contrary, the courts
may develop rules to enforce sanctions for frivolous practices.28
Until such standards are formulated, concluded the court, mone-
tary sanctions for frivolous litigation practices should be imposed
20 Id.
21 Id.
22 A.G. Ship Maintenance Corp. v. Lezak, 120 App. Div. 2d 662, 502 N.Y.S.2d 257 (2d
Dep't 1986). In denying the recovery of counsel fees, neither court indicated whether the
court lacked power to grant such relief or whether the defendant's request simply was not
meritorious. See id.
23 Lezak, 69 N.Y.2d 1, 6, 503 N.E.2d 681, 684, 511 N.Y.S.2d 216, 219 (1986).
21 Id. at 4, 503 N.E.2d at 682, 511 N.Y.S.2d at 217.
25 Id. at 4, 503 N.E.2d at 682-83, 511 N.Y.S.2d at 217-18.
2. Id. at 6, 503 N.E.2d at 684, 511 N.Y.S.2d at 219.
217 See id. at 5-6, 503 N.E.2d at 683-84, 511 N.Y.S.2d at 218-19. As sources for this
power, the court pointed to the New York Constitution, and the New York Judiciary Law.
See id.
The New York Constitution confers power on the legislature to alter and regulate juris-
diction and proceedings in law and equity. See N.Y. CONsT. art. 6, § 30. This authority to
regulate practice and procedure may be delegated to the courts. See id.
20 Lezak, 69 N.Y.2d at 6, 503 N.E.2d at 684, 511 N.Y.S.2d at 219. In accordance with
the Judiciary Law, the Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals has the power to establish stan-
dards and administrative policies relating to "implementation of rules and orders regulating
practice and procedure in the courts, subject to the reserved power of the legislature .. .
N.Y. JUD. LAW § 211(1)(b) (McKinney 1983).
[Vol. 62:172
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only under circumstances authorized by CPLR 8303-a.29
By refusing to impose sanctions, it is submitted that the Court
of Appeals properly insisted on the promulgation of a uniform rule
to penalize parties bringing frivolous suits rather than allowing the
question to be determined on a case-by-case basis. While the court
has not denied an inherent judicial power to enforce such sanc-
tions,30 neither has it affirmatively recognized that the power is in-
29 See supra note 8 and accompanying text (discussing CPLR 8303-a and its sanction
provisions).
10 See Lezak, 69 N.Y.2d at 6, 503 N.E.2d at 684, 511 N.Y.S.2d at 219. Indeed, the court
specifically stated that "[lt is not necessary to determine whether the power of the courts to
impose sanctions for frivolous proceedings is inherent to the judicial function or is merely
delegable by the Legislature under our Constitution." Id. Apparently, the court reasoned
that for the present, it was not essential to identify the source of the court's power; more
importantly, the court believed steps must be taken to end abuses of the judicial system.
It is suggested, however, that New York supports the federal courts' recognition that
inherent power to assess monetary sanctions does reside in the courts when claims are pur-
sued merely for purposes of delay, harassment, and intimidation. See Roadway Express, Inc.
v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 767 (1980) ("in a proper case, such sanctions are within a court's
powers"). Accord Ltown Ltd. Partnership v. Sire Plan, Inc., 108 App. Div. 2d 435, 440-41,
489 N.Y.S.2d 567, 572 (2d Dep't 1985) (inherent power "plainly resides in New York State
courts as well").
In Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240 (1975), environmen-
tal groups brought suit to prevent the Secretary of the Interior from issuing permits neces-
sary for the construction of a trans-Alaska pipeline. See id. at 241-45. The circuit court of
appeals awarded attorneys' fees on the grounds that respondents had acted to vindicate the
rights of all citizens to a clean environment. Id. at 245-46. The Supreme Court acknowl-
edged inherent judicial power to allow attorneys' fees in some situations. Id. at 259. See also
F.D. Rich Co. v. United States ex rel. Indus. Lumber Co., 417 U.S. 116, 129 (1974) (recog-
nizing inherent equitable power to award attorneys' fees if losing party acted in bad faith,
oppressively, wantonly or vexatiously); Day v. Amoco Chem. Corp., 595 F. Supp. 1120, 1122
(S.D. Tex. 1984) (malicious frivolous claim allows court to impose monetary sanctions), cert.
denied, 470 U.S. 1086 (1985); supra note 4 and accompanying text (discussing inherent pow-
ers doctrine).
New York has recognized that courts have inherent power to control their own business
and to conduct that business to safeguard the rights of all litigants. See Riglander v. Star
Co., 98 App. Div. 101, 104, 90 N.Y.S. 772, 774 (1st Dep't 1904), aff'd, 181 N.Y. 531, 73 N.E.
1131 (1905). Drawing on the federal courts' assertion of inherent judicial authority to justify
the imposition of monetary sanctions for frivolous litigation, a New York court has noted
that "[t]his inherent power ... plainly resides in New York State courts as well." Ltown,
108 App. Div. 2d at 441, 489 N.Y.S.2d at 572. In Ltown, one of the parties continually
opposed and delayed a mortgage foreclosure action at every stage of the proceedings. See id.
at 436, 489 N.Y.S.2d at 569. The Ltown court found suspect the motives for the delays and
the opposition to the proceedings, and sua sponte raised the issue of whether the party and
his counsel should be penalized for pursuing frivolous litigation. Id. at 438, 489 N.Y.S.2d at
570-71. Noting that New York courts have inherent power to control their calendars and
keep their houses in order, the Ltown court reasoned there was "no difficulty in concluding
that a New York appellate court may impose appropriate sanctions against an attorney, a
client, or both for the pursuit of frivolous litigation." Id. at 441, 489 N.Y.S.2d at 573. It is
submitted that although the Ltown court order awarding attorneys' fees was modified by
1987]
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herent.31 Rather, the court relied on the existence of its delegated
powers under the New York State Constitution and statutes to
adopt a sanctions rule, thereby avoiding the inherent power ques-
tion.32 The Court of Appeals decided on a course of court-initiated
rules3 3 apparently because use of the inherent power doctrine has
not resulted in the uniformity which the court has ascertained nec-
essary for the effective control of frivolous practices.34 A promul-
gated rule provides uniformity in administration, whereas ad hoc
rulings, presumably based on a court's inherent powers, potentially
preclude uniformity because of the amorphous nature of inherent
power 35 and judges' varying viewpoints concerning the utilization
the Court of Appeals in Lezak, this action was indicative of the Court of Appeals' desire to
develop a uniform sanctions rule rather than its denial of inherent power. See Oppenheim &
Macnow, P.C. v. Worth, 109 App. Div. 2d 602, 602, 486 N.Y.S.2d 997, 997 (1st Dep't 1985)
(sanctions sustained, though reduced); see also supra note 7 and accompanying text (sanc-
tions in New York); cf. Aslanis v. Southwest Sewer Dist., 92 App. Div. 2d 855, 855, 459
N.Y.S.2d 631, 632 (2d Dep't 1983) (disallowing monetary sanctions payable to the court
rather than movant imposed under inherent power doctrine).
Lezak, 69 N.Y.2d at 6, 503 N.E.2d at 684, 511 N.Y.S.2d at 219.
32 See id.
3 See N.Y.L.J., Jan. 8, 1987, at 1, col. 2. Following the Lezak decision, the Chief Ad-
ministrative Judge asked for comments from judges, lawyers and the public concerning the
scope of a rule authorizing courts to impose sanctions against attorneys. See id. Numerous
comments were received by the Office of Court Administration and the comment deadline of
September 18, 1987 was extended. See Rule Changes (Including Sanctions Rule), Sched-
uled To Take Effect January 1st, Put Off Indefinitely, 336 N.Y. ST. LAw DIG. 5 (Dec. 1987).
The consideration of comments and the integration of suggestions are among the factors
that have delayed the effective date of the rules, which was to have been January 1, 1988.
See id. Professor Siegel notes that some legislators have cast "a jaundiced eye" at the pro-
posed sanctions rule-Part 130 of the Uniform Rules. Id. "[L]egislative committee hearings
have been held to see whether the legislature should pick up all the reins on sanctions....
Prompt action by the legislature.., purporting with a general sanctions statute to preempt
the field, would put Part 130 on a back burner for a while, or incinerate it altogether." Id.
3' See Lezak, 69 N.Y.2d at 6, 503 N.E.2d at 684, 511 N.Y.S.2d at 219. Refusing to
employ its inherent powers, a counsel fees award was denied by the Court of Appeals be-
cause "these expenses are merely incidents of litigation and thus are not compensable in the
absence of statutory authority providing for such." City of Buffalo v. J.W. Clement Co., 28
N.Y.2d 241, 262-63, 269 N.E.2d 895, 908, 321 N.Y.S.2d 345, 364 (1971). For a somewhat
analogous situation in the federal courts, see Dow Chemical Pacific Ltd. v. Rascator Mari-
time S.A., 782 F.2d 329 (2d Cir. 1986), which found that one defendant acting in bad faith
does not justify an award of fees against co-defendant. See id. at 344. See also Weinberger
v. Kendrick, 698 F.2d 61, 80 (2d Cir. 1982) ("high degree of specificity" required when attor-
neys' fees awarded on bad faith basis), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 818 (1983); Browning Deben-
ture Holders' Comm. v. DASA Corp., 560 F.2d 1078, 1088 (2d Cir. 1977) (claims not entirely
without color).
35 See, e.g., Deancey v. Pipegras, 141 N.Y. 88, 96, 35 N.E. 1089, 1091 (1894) (difficult to
define inherent judicial power); Gabrelian v. Gabrelian, 108 App. Div. 2d 445, 451, 489
N.Y.S.2d 914, 920 (2d Dep't 1985) (inherent judicial power not susceptible to exact defini-
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of these powers.3
The effectiveness of a promulgated rule, however, may be
achieved only through judicial discretion in the application of the
rule to differing factual situations.3 7 Thus, it is asserted, any sanc-
tions imposed are necessarily ad hoc. Therefore, the court should
have formally embraced the inherent powers doctrine to supple-
ment the forthcoming rule. By failing to do so, the court may have
prematurely obviated the effectiveness of the rule.
Furthermore, the court's decision in Lezak to proceed deliber-
ately in imposing a general sanction rule may have been affected
by the example of the federal courts in interpreting Rule 11. Since
Rule 11 was amended in 1983, its interpretation and application
has been unsettled.3 8 Questions have arisen regarding the determi-
nation of an objective standard of bad faith, 9 the parameters of
tion). The definition is often tautological. See United States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch)
32, 34 (1812) ("[c]ertain implied powers must necessarily result to our Courts of justice ...
because they are necessary .... ").
36 See, e.g., Gabrelian, 108 App. Div. 2d at 456-58, 489 N.Y.S.2d at 924-26 (Lazar, J.,
concurring) (disagreeing strongly over sanctions issue); Schwarzer, Sanctions Under the
New Federal Rule 11-A Closer Look, 104 F.R.D. 181, 204-05 (1985) (supporting deterrent
effect of sanctions). Judge Schwarzer's view is in sharp contrast to Chief Judge Weinstein of
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York, who views Rule 11 as
having "increased the tension in litigation, and increased the amount of extra motions and
extra appeals." Lewin, A Legal Curb Raises Hackles, N.Y. Times, Oct. 2, 1986, at D8, col. 6.
37 See Schwarzer, supra note 36, at 201; see also Gabrelian, 108 App. Div. 2d at 455,
489 N.Y.S.2d at 923 (pro se litigant's conduct should not be measured against same stan-
dard as member of bar). But see Taylor v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., 594 F. Supp. 226,
227-28 (N.D.N.Y.) ($35,000 in attorneys' fees imposed on pro se litigant for "irresponsible
and inexcusable approach to the law"), aff'd without opinion, 751 F.2d 371 (2d Cir. 1984).
Whether an attorney has made a "reasonable inquiry" into the underlying facts of a claim is
a factual determination. See Mohammed v. Union Carbide Corp., 606 F. Supp. 252, 261
(E.D. Mich. 1985); see also Zaldivar v. City of Los Angeles, 780 F.2d 823, 831 (9th Cir. 1986)
("reasonable inquiry" within circumstances of the case).
39 See Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1373
(1987). Recognizing that courts must be sensitive to the impact of sanctions on attorneys,
see id. at 1280, the Oliveri court reversed a decision imposing sanctions on the plaintiff's
attorney, reasoning that Rule 11 was limited to an attorney's conduct at the time papers are
signed, and not meant to demand a continuing obligation from counsel. See id. at 1274. But
see Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, 762 F.2d 243 (2d Cir. 1985). In Eastway, the
court interpreted Rule 11 as expanding the inherent equitable powers of the court to levy
sanctions, see id. at 253, and viewed sanctions under Rule 11 as mandatory because the rule
is "clearly phrased as a directive." Id. at 254 n.7; see also Rodgers v. Lincoln Towing Serv.
Inc., 596 F. Supp. 13, 27 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (court concluded lawyers cannot be free to "plead
now and think about the legal validity of their pleadings later"), aff'd, 771 F.2d 194 (7th Cir.
1984); see generally S. KASSIN, AN EjpmcArL STUDY OF RULE 11 SANCTIONS 18-45 (1985)
(Rule 11 applied with limited clarity and uniformity).
See Zaldivar v. City of Los Angeles, 780 F.2d 823 (9th Cir. 1986). Ruling that sanc-
tions were improperly assessed, the Zaldivar court concluded that a finding of subjective
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reasonable inquiry,40 and the meaning of a frivolous claim or mo-
tion.41 Thus, Lezak may represent New York's effort to solve the
problem of frivolous litigation practices while attempting to avoid
the difficulties observed in the federal experience.
By refusing to direct sanctions, the Court of Appeals delivered
a clear message to the legislature and the courts that unless a stat-
ute or court rule is promulgated to deal with the issue of sanctions,
aggrieved parties will have no remedy. It is submitted that New
York would do well to promulgate a sanctions rule that will work
in conjunction with the recognized inherent power of the courts.
Without such recognition of inherent court powers, any statute or
rule may create additional problems in this controversial area.
Joyce Onorato Abamont
bad faith was not necessary to impose Rule 11 sanctions. See id. at 829. It should be noted
that prior to the 1983 amendment to Rule 11, it was construed as speaking in "plainly sub-
jective terms." See Nemeroff v. Abelson, 620 F.2d 339, 350 (2d Cir. 1980). "A claim is colora-
ble," reasoned the Nemeroft court, "when it has some legal and factual support, considered
in light of the reasonable beliefs of the individual making the claim. The question is
whether a reasonable attorney could have concluded that facts supporting the claim might
be established, not whether such facts actually had been established." Id. at 348 (footnote
omitted).
10 See Golden Eagle Distrib. Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 103 F.R.D. 124 (N.D. Cal. 1984),
rev'd, 801 F.2d 1531 (9th Cir. 1986). In Golden Eagle, the district court, sua sponte, levied
sanctions on a party's legal counsel, determining that the law firm had engaged in mislead-
ing conduct in filing motion papers because it had failed to cite contrary authority and
implied that its position was warranted by existing law, not by an extension of existing law.
See id. at 128-29. The sanctions were imposed despite the district court's holding that the
positions on the papers were supportable, both legally and factually. See id. at 129. The
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, however, because sanctions cannot be im-
posed where "a plausible good faith argument can be made." Golden Eagle, 801 F.2d 1531,
1541 (9th Cir. 1986) (quoting Zaldivar, 780 F.2d at 832); see also Van Berkel v. Fox Farm &
Road Mach., 581 F. Supp. 1248, 1251 (D. Minn. 1984) (attorney did not make reasonable
inquiry upon which to base belief).
"' See, e.g., Gattuso v. Pecorella, 733 F.2d 709, 710 (9th Cir. 1984) (frivolous means
"result is obvious and the arguments of error are wholly without merit"); In re Marriage of
Flaherty, 31 Cal. 3d 637, 650, 646 P.2d 179, 187-88, 183 Cal. Rptr. 508, 516-17 (appeal with-
out merit not by definition frivolous); Risinger, Honesty in Pleading and its Enforcement:
Some "Striking" Problems with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, 61 MINN. L. REv. 1, 61
(1976) (today's frivolity "may become tomorrow's law"); see generally Oberman, Coping
with Rising Caseload II: Defining the Frivolous Civil Appeal, 47 BROOKLYN L. REv. 1057,
1058 (1981) (challenge to eliminate frivolous cases without unfairly discharging claims of
potential substance).
